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4Abatcact
A novel procedure was used in three experiments to examine
10.5-month-old infants' understanding of containment. The infants in 
Experiment 1 saw two test events. In both events a hand rotated a 
container forward and then back, filled it with salt, and then emptied the 
salt from the container. The two test events were identical except for the 
specific container used. In one event (possible event) a box was shown 
which had intact bottom and sides. The other event (impossible event) 
showed a tube that appeared to have no bottom (actually, a transparent 
plastic disk inserted half-way into the container acted as an invisible 
bottom). The Infants looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the 
possible event, suggesting that they realized that an object with no bottom 
is unable to contain. Experiment 2 examined whether infants also 
understand that a container must have sufficient sides in order to contain. 
The infants again saw two test events of rotating, filling, and emptying.
In the possible test event, a container with intact sides and bottom was 
used, and in the impossible test event, a container with a large hole cut in 
its side was used. The infants looked equally at the two test events, 
suggesting that they did not understand that an object needs sufficient 
sides in order to contain. Experiment 3 examined whether infants would 
better understand the task if familiarization trials were added showing 
examples of different containers holding salt. The same procedure was 
used as In Experiment 2, and again the results were negative, suggesting 
that either the infants did not understand that an object needs sufficient 
sides in order to contain, or the experimental procedure was Inadequate to 
test this issue with infants.
Young Infants' Understanding of Containment
The desire to understand infants' perception of the physical world has 
motivated researchers to investigate many physical events and object 
relations. For example, investigators have examined Infants' understanding 
of occlusions (e. g. Baillargeon, 1986 ,1987a, 1987b, in press; Baillargeon 
& Graber, 1987; Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; Hood & Wlllats, 
1986; Spelke, in press), collusions (e. g. Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Baillargeon 
1 9 8 6 ,1987a), support relations between objects (e. g. Baillargeon & 
Hanko-Summers, in press; Macomber, Spelke, & Kell, 1988), rigid and 
non-rigid transformations (e. g. Gibson & Spelke, 1983; Gibson, Owsley, & 
Johnston, 1978; Gibson, Owsley, Walker, & Megaw-Nyce, 1979; Walker, 
Owsley, Megaw-Nyoe, Gibson, & Bahrick, 1980), and so on. In general, the 
results obtained by these researchers have indicated that the physical 
world of infants is, in many important respects, similar to that of older 
children and adults.
Enoouraged by these findings, a few investigators have begun 
addressing a new research question, namely, can infants use their physical 
knowledge to understand the relation between the functional and the 
structural characteristics of physical objects?
Consider the function of containment. Adults understand that in order 
to contain, an object must have a bottom and sides capable of providing 
support. That is, adults can analyze the object and identify the physical 
structures - the full bottom and sides - that make the object capable of 
functioning as a  oontainer. Are infants, like adults, capable of perceiving
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the links between an object's structure and function? Do they understand, 
more specifically, that an object with a full bottom and sides can serve as 
a container, but an object without a bottom or with incomplete sides 
cannot? The present experiments were designed to address these 
questions.
There has been only one attempt at investigating infants' understanding 
of containment. Caron, Caron , and Antell (1988) recently conducted two 
experiments that examined the ability of 11-, 14-, 17-, and 20- 
month-old infants to detect tho structural properties that are necessary 
for containment. The first experiment used a "violation of expectancy" 
paradigm with videotaped events as stimuli. The infants watched 
alternating video episodes of a violation and nonviolation containment 
event involving either a proper cylindrical container with a bottom and 
sides (can condition), or an improper cylindrical container with no bottom 
(tube condition). The infants in the can condition saw salt filling the can 
to the brim and then being quickly poured out in the nonviolation episode, 
and they saw salt being poured into the can and immediately falling out the 
can's bottom in the violation episode. The infants in the tube condition 
saw salt being poured into the tube and immediately falling out in the 
nonviolation episode, and they saw salt filling the tube to the brim and 
then being poured out in the violation episode.
It was not until the age of 17 months that the infants looked reliably 
longer at the violation than at the nonviolation episodes. The authors 
interpreted this result to mean that infants aged less than 17 months do 
not understand the function of containment, because they show no surprise
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7when salt (a) fails to be contained in a cylinder with a bottom or (b) is 
contained in a bottomless cylinder.
There is an alternative interpretation of the negative results obtained 
with the younger infants: the use of videotaped stimuli versus live, 
three-dimensional stimuli could have hindered their performance. To test 
this hypothesis, Caron et al. (1988) conducted a second experiment with 
the same age infants. The infants were shown three, white, styrofoam 
cups (two intact and one bottomless). The infants were familiarized with 
the function of containment when the experimenter dropped three red 
cubes into one of the intact cups (the other two being hidden), shook the 
cup vigorously so that the cubes could be heard rattling inside, and then 
spilled them out onto the table. During the test events, the experimenter 
put away the demonstration cup and took out the remaining intact cup and 
the bottomless cup. Holding one cup in each hand, the experimenter tilted 
the cups at an angle to show the infants that one cup had a bottom and one 
did not. Each infant was then given a cube and the experimenter held the 
cups close to the infant, encouraging him or her to deposit the cube into a 
cup. Each infant was asked on four successive trials to select the intact 
or the bottomless cup. The authors reasoned that infants who understood 
that objects require a bottom in order to contain would select the intact 
cup more often than the bottomless cup. The results indicated that it was 
not until 17 months of age that the infants chose the intact cup on at least 
three of the four trials. The authors concluded that (a) the use of video 
representations in the first experiment had not caused an underestimation 
of the ability of their younger infants to understand containment and (b)
8the results of their two experiments were consistent in suggesting that 
11- and 14-month-old infants a re .. Dt aware of the * 1 ye. I propertu s 
that are necessary for containment.
The conclusion reached by Caron et al. (1988) that inf n< ageu i - h 
17 months do not understand containment is surprising for two 
reasons. First, as was mentioned earlier, recent investigat ns of infants' 
physical knowledge have revealed a suprisingly sophist rated 
understanding of a wide variety of physical events (e. g. Baillargeon, 1986, 
1987a; Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; Leslie & Keeble, 1987; 
Macomber, Spelke. & Keil, 1988; Gibson & Spelke, 1983; Gibson, Owsley, & 
Johnston, 1978). Second, and more specifically, recent evidence (e.g. 
Baillargeon & Hanko-Summers, in press; Macomber, Spelke, & Keil, 1988) 
suggests that infants considerably younger than 17 months of age already 
possess soms* knowledge of support relations between objects. In one 
study, Baillargeon and Hanko-Summers (in press) examined the ability of
9.5-month-old infants to distinguish between adequate and inadequate 
support for an object. The infants saw two identical boxes placed side by 
side. A large box was placed on the right box with their right edges 
aligned; the loft corner of the large box rusted on the left box. The right 
box aione provided adequate support for the large box but the left box did 
not. Tlie infants were shown two test events. In one (possible) event, the 
left box moved past the left edge of the large box, which then rested on the 
right box. In the other (impossible) event, the right box moved past the 
right edge of the large box, which then rested on the left box. The infants 
looked significantly longer at the impossible than at the possible event,
9suggesting that they understood that the left box alone did not provide 
adequate support for the large box and hence were suprised that 
the large box did not fall when the right box was moved aside.
The results of Baillargeon and Hanko-Summers (1988) suggested that, 
by 9.5 months of age, infants expect an object that receives inadequate 
support to fall. Recently, Macomber, Spelke and Kell (1988) examined 
whether 6-month-old infants expect an object that receives qq support to 
fall (such an expectation is clearly simpler than and is likely to develop 
prior to that investigated by Baillargeon and Hanko-Summers, namely 
adequate versus inadequate support). The infants were habituated to an 
object falling behind a screen and landing on the first of two surfaces in 
its path. The object's final position was revealed by lifting the screen 
after its fall was completed. Following habituation, the first surface was 
removed, and the infants were shown two test events. In one (possible) 
event, the object was dropped and was revealed on the lower surface; in 
the other (impossible) event, the object was dropped and was revealed, 
suspended in mid-air, in the same position it occupied at the end 
of its fall during habituation. The infants looked reliably longer at the 
impossible than at the possible event, indicating that by 6 months of age, 
infants already have some understanding that objects must be provided 
with support to keep from falling.
Together, these two experiments suggest that, long before the age of 17 
months, infants possess valid intuitions about support relations between 
objects. Since the notion of containment is closely related to that of 
support, it is surprising that, according to the data of Caron et al. (1988),
such a long time period separates infants' attainment of these two notions. 
After all, a container is simply an object with bottom and side surfaces 
capable of providing support for substances. From the youngest age, 
infants are given repeated experiences with containers - bowls, cups, 
bottles, glasses, bath toys, and so on - ,  experiences that should facilitate 
the application of their intuitions about support to their understanding of 
the physical properties of containers.
In the present research, a novel method was derived to investigate 
infants' notion of containment. Experiment 1 examined whether
10.5-month-old infants understand that a concave object that does not 
have a bottom cannot function as a container. The infants watched three 
familiarization and two test events. At the start of each event, a human 
hand, wearing a long silver glove, held a container vertically at the center 
of a display box. Next, the hand rotated the container forward and then 
backward, so the infants could observe first one end and then tho opposite 
end of the container. The hand then moved the container beneath a 
protrusion in the back wall of the display box. From this protrusion, salt 
was poured into the container; the infants could see a small white stream 
of salt fall into the top of the container, and none fall out of the bottom.
Next, the hand moved the container to a hole in the floor of the display box 
and emptied out the salt. The whole process was repeated until the trial 
ended. Three similar containers were used in the three familiarization 
events; all were cylindrical, had brightly colored exteriors, and were 
decorated with dark geometric shapes. The container used in one of the 
test events (possible event) differed markedly, in shape and decoration,
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from the three familiarization containers. It consisted of a small box 
covered with white contact paper decorated with small pastel flowers.
The container used in the other test event (impossible event) was 
generally similar to the three familiarization containers; like them it was 
cylindrical, brightly-colored, and decorated with dark geometrical shapes. 
However, it differed from these containers in one crucial respect: it 
appeared to have no bottom (in reality, a transparent plastic disc inserted 
half-way into the container acted as an invisible bottom).
Our reasoning was as follows. If the infants understood that an object 
that lacks n bottom cannot function as a container, then they should be 
surprised in the impossible event when salt was poured into and remained 
within the tube. Since infants' surprise at an event typically manifests 
itself by prolonged attention to the event, they should look longer at the 
impossible than at the possible event (e.g. Spelke, 1985). If, on the other 
hand, as Caron et al. (1988) would predict, the infants did not realize that 
a bottom is a necessary property for containment, they should (a) look 
longer at the possible than at the impossible event, because the box 
differed more than the tube from the containers used in the familiarization 
events, or (b) look equally at the box and the tube events because neither 
event was surprising.
There was one foreseeable difficulty with the design of the 
experiment. The infants might look longer at the impossible than at the 
possible event because they found the tube intrinsically more interesting 
than the box, despite the fact that the latter was less similar to the 
familiarization containers and hence more novel. To check this alternative
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interpretation, we tested a second group of 10.5-month-old infants in a 
control condition that was identical to the experimental condition with 
one major exception: no salt was used during any of the events. The hand 
performed exactly the same actions, but no salt was poured in or out of 
the containers. We reasoned that if the infants in the experimental 
condition looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible 
event because they found the tube more attractive than the box, then the 
infants in the control condition should also look longer at the tube than at 
the box event. On the other hand, if the infants in the experimental 
condition looked longer at the impossible event because they were 
surprised that the salt remained within the tube, then there was no reason 
for the infants in the control condition to look longer at the tube than at 
the box event, since the tube event would not seem surprising.
Experiment 1 
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 36 healthy, full-term infants ranging in age from 9 
months, 20 days to 11 months, 11 days (M - 1 0  months, 14 days). Six other 
infants were excluded from the experiment, 3 because of fussiness, 2 
because of experimental difficulties, and 1 because the primary observer 
could not follow the direction of the infant's gaze. The infants' names were 
obtained from birth announcements in the local newspaper, and the parents 
were contacted by letters and follow-up phone calls. The parents were 
offered reimbursement for their travel expenses but were not compensated 
for their participation.
Half of the infants were randomly assigned to the experimental 
condition, and half to the control condition.
Apparatus
The apparatus consisted of a large wooden display box 103 cm high, 98 
cm wide and 50 cm deep. The infant faced an opening 41 cm high and 92 cm 
wide in the front wall of the apparatus. The floor of the apparatus was 
pale green cardboard, the back wall was covered with dark contact paper, 
and the side w M  were covered with light contact paper.
Thore were holes in the rear, side, and floor of the apparatus through 
which the experimenters could manipulate the experimental stimuli. In the 
right wall of the apparatus there was a hole 21 cm by 18 cm through which 
an experimenter could manipulate the container during the events. The 
side hole was 11 cm from the floor of the apparatus and 15 cm from
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the rear wall. In the back wall of the apparatus there was a 17 cm by 19 
cm hole through which another experimenter could pour salt into a 
container held below the hole. The hole was hidden from the infants' view 
by an elevated screen 23.5 cm high and 27 cm wide that was covered with 
the same dark contact paper as the back wall. This screen was affixed to  
the back wall in such a way that it hung 9 cm in front of the hole, 18 cm 
from the right wall, and 25 cm above the floor of the apparatus. During the 
events shown to the infants in the experimental condition, the first 
experimenter held a container beneath the gap separating the screen and 
the hole in the back wall; the second experimenter, hidden behind the back 
wall, inserted a funnel Into the hole and poured salt into the container.
The rear hole was 28 cm above the floor of the apparatus and 22 cm from 
the right side. In the floor of the apparatus was a round hole 12 cm in 
diameter. Salt was emptied from the containers through this hole. The 
hole was 27 cm from the rear wall and 35 cm from the right wall of the 
apparatus.
Opaque screens below the display box and at angles from the sides of 
the display box created a three sided booth around the subject, concealing 
the experimenters and observers from his or her view. The screens were 
made from white muslin stretched across wooden frames. The screen 
below the display box was 75 cm high and 98 cm wide and the side screens 
were 178 cm high and 79 cm wide. An Jther muslin-covered frame 61 cm 
high and 93 cm wide was lowered in front of the opening in the front of the 
apparatus between trials.
Five containers were used in the experiment, three in the
14
15
familiarization trials, and two in the test trials. The familiarization 
containers were all cylindrical and brightly colored with dark geometric 
shapes decorating them. They varied in height, diameter, color and 
decorative shape. The first was 8.5 cm high, 8 cm In diameter, bright 
yellow with 4 large red hearts on the exterior and lined with pastel pink 
contact paper in the interior; the second was 10 cm high, 6 cm In diameter, 
bright b ite with 8 dark purple diamonds on the exterior and lined with 
pastel yellow contact paper in the interior; and the third was 13 cm high, 
5.5 cm in diameter, bright pink with 11 black spots on the exterior and 
lined with pastel blue contact paper In the interior.
The container used In the possible test event shown to the infants in 
the experimental condition differed markedly from the three 
familiarization containers, it was a box 10.5 cm by 8cm and 9.5 cm deep 
coverc .. ,. iside and out by white contact paper with a flower pattern of 
pastel colors.
The container used in the impossible test event shown to the infante in 
the experimental condition was cylindrical, 11 cm high, 7 cm in diameter, 
bright yellow in color, decorated with 8 black diamonds, and lined in black 
in the interior. This container was thus generally similar to the 
containers used during the familiarization events. Like these containers, 
it was cylindrical with a brightly colored exterior decorated with dark 
geometric shapes. Furthermore, its exterior was the same color as the 
first container, it was decorated with the same shapes as the second 
container, and these shapes were black in color like those of the third 
container. Despite these similarities, however, the impossible event
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container differed from the familiarization events in one crucial respect: 
it appeared to have no bottom. To accomplish this a transparent plastic 
disk was inserted half-way down the tube to act as an invisible bottom.
This bottom made it possible for the tube to contain the salt during the 
experimental condition tube test event. The same two containers, the box 
and the tube, were used in the control condition test events.
During the experiment, the test room ceiling lights were turned off; 
the apparatus was illuminated by four lights (each with a 40-W lightbulb) 
attached to the front and side wall3 of the apparatus. This method of 
lighting (together with the back wall's dark covering and the tube's black 
lining) helped prevent detection of the tube's transparent bottom.
Events
Experimental condition events
Two experimenters worked in concert to produce the familiarization 
and test events. The first wore a silver spandex glove 70 cm long on his or 
her right hand and arm and manipulated the containers; the second stood 
behind the back wall of the apparatus and poured salt into the containers.
Familiarization events. The three familiarization events were all 
produced in exactly the same manner. The only difference between the 
events was the specific container used. The yellow container was used in 
the first event, the blue in tire second, and the pink in the third, t he 
numbers in parentheses Indicate about how long the experimenters took to 
perform the actions described.
At the start of each event, the first experimenter held the container 
vertically in his or her gloved right hand, about 16 cm above the floor of
the apparatus, 20 cm from the back wall, and 24 cm from the right wall. 
The first experimenter rotated the container forward (1 s), paused (1 s) so 
that the infant could examine the inside of the container, and then rotated 
the container back to a vertical position (1s). Next, the first 
experimenter rotated the container backward (1 s), then paused (1 s) to 
give the infant the opportunity to study the opposite end of the container.
Next, the first experimenter moved the container (1 s) to the gap 
separating the screen from the back wall; he or she held the container in a 
vertical position about half-way between the screen's lower edge and the 
floor of the apparatus. The second experimenter, who had inserted in 
readiness a funnel into the hole behind the screen, then poured salt into 
the container (3 s). The infant could see the salt fall into the container in 
a small white stream, and could also see that no salt fell out of the 
container's bottom (l.e., the salt remained within the container). Next, the 
first experimenter moved the container to the hole in the floor of the 
apparatus (1 s), and poured the salt into the hole (3 s). The salt was 
poured from approximately 6 cm above the hole, with the side of the 
container facing the infant throughout the pouring. The first experimenter 
then returned the container to its starting position (1 s).
Each event cycle thus lasted approximately 14 s. Cycles were 
repeated until the computer signaled that the trial had ended. When this 
happened, the second experimenter lowered the curtain in front of the 
opening in the front wall of the apparatus.
Impossible and possible test events. The impossible and possible 
test events were identical to the familiarization events described above
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with two exceptions. First, different containers were used: the tube in the 
impossible event, and the box in the possible event. Second, when the tube 
was rotated forward at the start of the event, the first experimenter 
wiggled his or hr 'mallest two fingers behind the tube. We hoped this 
would help the Infant focus on the fact that the tube had no apparent 
bottom.
CojitfoLcQnditiQn .py.snts
The familiarization and tube and box test events shown to the infants 
in the control condition were identical to the familiarization and 
impossible and possible test events shown to the infants in the 
experimental condition, respectively, with one exception: no salt was used 
during any of the events. The first experimenter went through exactly the 
same actions as before, rotating the container forward and backward, 
holding it beneath the screen, moving it to the hole in the floor of the 
apparatus and pretending to pour, without any salt being used.
To help the experimenters adhere to the 14 s schedule described above 
throughout the familiarization and test events shown to the infants in the 
experimental and control conditions, the experimenters listened through 
headphones to a metronome beating once per second. Quiet music was 
played throughout the events to help mask the sout d of the salt being 
poured into the containors during the experimental condition events. 
Eroeedum
Prior to the beginning of the experiment, each infant was encouraged 
to manipulate the containers used in the experiment. During these 
manipulations, a tube without a transparent bottom (i.e. an empty tube)
18
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was substituted for the tube used in the tube test event.
During the experiment, the infant sat on his or her parent's lap in front 
of the apparatus. The infant's head was approximately 95 cm from the 
back wall. The parent was asked not to interact with the infant during the 
experiment. At the start of the test trials the parent was instructed 
to close his or her eyes.
The infant*s looking behavior was monitored by two observers who 
viewed the infant through peepholes in the cloth-covered frames on either 
side of the apparatus. The observers could not see the containers and they 
did not know the order in which the test events were presented (i.e. 
possible first and then impossible or impossible first and then possible). 
Each observer held a bottom box linked to a MICRO/PDP-11 computer and 
depressed the button when the infant attended to the experimental events. 
Interobserver agreement was calculated for each trial on the basis of the 
number of seconds for which the observers agreed on the direction of the 
infant's gaze, out of the total number of seconds the trial lasted. 
Disagreements of less than 0.1 s were ignored. Agreement averaged 90 % 
per trial per infant. The looking times recorded by the primary observer 
were used to determine when a trial had ended (see below).
The experiment consisted of three phases: pretest, familiarization, and 
test. During the pretest phase, each infant received two trials that were 
designed to acquaint him or her with the test trial containers. Half 
of the infants in each condition saw the tube first, and half saw the box 
first. During each trial, the first experimenter continuously rotated the 
container forward and backward, just as he or she did in the initial part of
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the familiarization and test events. Each trial ended when the infant (a) 
looked away from the display for 2 consecutive s after having looked at it 
for at least 5 cumulative s or (b) looked at the display for 30 cumulative s 
without looking away for 2 cumulative s.
During the familiarization phase, the nfants in each condition saw the 
three familiarization events described above on three successive 
trials. As was mentioned earlier, the infants saw the yellow container on 
the first trial, the blue container on the second trial, and the pink 
container on the third trial. At the start of each trial, the first 
experimenter continued to rotate the container forward and backward until 
the computer signaled that the infant had looked for 5 cumulative s. This 
ensured that the infant had noted both ends of each container. Each 
familiarization trial ended when the infant (a) looked away for 2 
consecutive s after having looked at the event for at least 9 cumulative s 
(beginning at the end of the pretrial, when the first experimenter moved 
the container beneath the hidden funnel) or (b) looked at the event for 30 
cumulative s without looking away for 2 consecutive s (ag> in beginning at 
the end of ths pretrial). The 9 s value was chosen because it ensured that 
the infants could have seen one complete cycle of salt being poured in and 
out of the container.
During the lost phase, the infants in each condition saw the two test 
events described above. The infants who saw the tube first during the 
pretest phase saw the impossible/tube test event first, and the infants 
who saw the box first during the pretest phase saw the possible/box test 
event first. The infants saw the two test events on alternate trials until
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they had completed three palm of teat trials. The criteria used to 
determine the beginning and end of trials were the same as for the 
familiarization trials.
One of the 36 infants in the experiment completed only two pairs of 
test events because of fussiness, but she was still included in the data 
analysis.
Results
Figure 2 shows the mean looking times of the infants in the 
experimental and the control conditions during the test phase of die
I
experiment. The infants in the experimental condition looked longer at the 
impossible than at the possible test event, whereas those in the control 
condition looked longer at the box than at the tube event.
INSERT FIGURE 1a AND 1b
The infants' looking times at the test events were analyzed by means 
of a 2 X 3 X 2 mixed model analysis of varianoe with Condition 
(experimental or control condition) as the betwaen-subjects factors and 
with Event (impossible/tube or possible/box event) and Test Pair (first, 
second, or third pair of test trials) as within-subjcct factors. Beoause the 
design was unbalanced, we used the SAS GLM prooedure to compute the 
anova (SAS Institute, 1985). There was a significant main effect of 
condition, E(1,34 ) -1 5 .1 0 , g < .05, and a significant Condition X Event 
interaction £ (1 ,101) -1 3 .5 3 , p < .0005. Planned comparisons indicated 
that the infants in the experimental condition looked reliably longer at the 
impossible (M -  26.9) than at the possible (M -  23.5) event, E (1 ,101) -  
9.44, o  < 003, whereas the intents in the control condition looked reliably 
longer at the box (M  -  21.3) than at the tube ( M - 19.0) event, E(1,101) -  
4.50, p  < .05 .
22
fllscusatan
The infants in the experimental condition looked reliably longer at the 
impossible test event than at the possible test event. These results 
suggest that the infants (a) were aware that a concave object that has a 
bottom (e.g., box) can function as a container; (b) recognized that a concave 
object that does not have a bottom (e.g., tube) cannot function as a 
container and hence (c) were surprised that the tube contained the salt 
when it had no bottom. Thus, contrary o what Caron et al. (1988) claimed, 
it appears that infants as young as 10.5 months of age understand, at least 
in simple situations, the function of containment.
The fact that the infants in the control condition looked reliably 
longer at the box than at the tube event suggests that these infants 
realized that the box was perceptually more different than the tube from 
the familiarization containers.
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Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 showed that 10.5-month-old infants 
understand, at least in simple situations, that a container must have a 
bottom in order to contain. Experiment 2 was designed to examine whether 
infants of the same age also understand that a container must have 
sufficient sides in order to contain.
The infants saw two test events. In both events the infant saw a hand 
rotate a container to show the top, bottom, and sides, fill the container 
with salt, and then empty the salt from the containers. The only 
difference between the two events was the specific container used. In the 
possible test event, a container with intact sides and bottom was used, 
and in the impossible test event, a container with a large hole cut in its 
side was used. Our reasoning was that if infants understand that an 
object needs both a bottom and intact sides in order to contain, then the 
infants should look longer at the impossible than at the possible event.
24
M att
Subjects were 20 healthy, full-term infants ranging in age from 10 
months, 25 days to 12 months, 4 days (M  -  11 months, 14 days). One other 
infant was excluded from the experiment due to fussiness.
Apparatus
The apparatus consisted of a large, wooden display box 103 cm high,
98 cm wide, and 44 cm deep. The infant faced an opening 41 cm high and 
92 cm wide in the front wall of the apparatus. The floor of the apparatus 
was pale green cardboard, the back wall was red cardboard, and the side 
walls were covered with light colored contact paper.
There were two holes in the back wall of the apparatus through which 
the experimenters could manipulate the experimental stimuli. The first 
hole, which was 20 cm high and 18 cm wide, was located 28 cm above the 
floor of the apparatus and 35 cm from the right wall. The second 
experimenter used this hole to pour salt into the containers. The hole was 
hidden from the infant's view by a screen 28 cm high and 28 cm wide that 
was made of the same red cardboard as the back wall. This screen was 
affixed to the back wall in such a way that it hung 10 cm in front of the 
hole, 32 cm from the right wall, and 24 cm above the floor of the 
apparatus. The second, smaller hole in the back wall of the apparatus, 
which was 2 cm high and 3 cm wide, was covered with red mesh and was 
used by the first experimenter to guide her actions as she manipulated the 
containers inside the apparatus. The hole was located 8.5 cm from the 
right wall 19.5 cm from the floor of the apparatus.
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As in Experiment 1, in the floor of the apparatus was a round hole 12 
cm in diameter. Salt was emptied from the containers through this hole, 
which was located 15 cm from the rear wall and 33 cm from the right 
wall of the apparatus.
Two containers were used in the experiment. These containers were 
cylindrical and were covered with pastel-colored contact paper on the 
exterior and bright-colored contact paper on the interior. They were 
identical in height, 14 cm, and diameter, 8.5 cm, but differed in color and 
in the fact that one of the containers had a large hole in its side wall. The 
container used in the possible event was paste! pink with white flowers on 
the exterior and lined with bright green contact paper in the interior. The 
container used in the impossible event was pastel blue with small white 
flowers on the exterior and was lined with bright yellow contact paper in 
the Interior, in addition, the impossible event container had a hole 7.5 cm 
high and 5 cm wide that was 8 cm from the top of the container extending 
all of the way to the bottom of the container. Inside the impossible event 
container was a transparent plastic disk; this disk was inserted 4.5 cm 
from the top of the container (above the hole) and acted as an invisible 
bottom for the salt. The possible container also had a transparent disk, 
placed the same distance from the top, so that (a) the sound of the salt 
hitting the transparent bottoms would be the same in the two containers 
and (b) the amount of time between the pouring of the salt and the sound of 
the salt hitting the bottom of the containers was the same. The tops of 
both containers and the edges of the hole in the impossible container were 
trimmed with black tape. On the exterior of both containers were two 1.5
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cm high by 2 cm wide pieces of velcro spaced 14.5 cm apart around the 
perimeter of the containers. The purpose of the velcro "/as to allow for 
easier handling of the containers. The first experimenter wore a gold 
spandex glove, 70 cm long, that had complimentary velcro pieces on the 
thumb and middle finger. The ceiling lights were not turned off in 
Experiment 2, as in Experiment 1, because it was not thought necessary. 
ElfflDiS
Two experimenters worked in concert to produce the test events. The 
first wore the gold spandex glove on his or her left arm and manipulated 
fhe containers; the second stood behind the back wall of the apparatus and 
poured salt into the containers.
impossible test event. At the start of the event, the first 
experimenter held the blue container vertically in his or her gloved left 
hand (2 s), about 7.5 cm above the floor of the apparatus, 20 cm from the 
back wall, and 17.5 cm from the right wall. The container was held in 
such a way that the hole was directly facing the infant. Next, the first 
experimenter rotated the container backward to a horizontal position (2 s) 
so that the infant could examine the bottom of the container. The first 
experimenter then rolated the container back to a vertical position (1 s) 
and moved it to the gap separating the screen from the back wall (1 s), 
tilting the container slightly to make it more salient that the salt should 
fall out of the container and not remain on the bottom of the container.
The second experimenter, who had inserted in readiness a funnel into the 
hole behind the screen, then poured salt into the container (3 s). The infant 
could see the salt fall into the m tainer in a small white stream, and
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could also see that no salt fell out of the container's bottom (i.e., 
salt remained within the container). Next, the first experimenter i 
the container to the hole in the floor of the apparatus (1 s), and po> the 
salt into the hole (3 s). The first experimenter then returned the coi.. tiner 
to its starting position (1 s).
Each event thus lasted approximately 14 s. Cycles were repeated 
until the computer signalled that the trial had ended. When this happened, 
the second experimenter lowered the curtain in front of the opening in the 
front wall of the apparatus.
Possible test event. The possible test event was identical to the 
impossible test event except that the blue container was replaced by the 
pink, intact container.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of two phases: pretest and test. During the 
pretest phase, each infant received two trials that were designed to 
acquaint him or her with the test containers. Half of the infants in each 
condition saw the impossible event container first, and half saw the 
possible event container first. During each trial, the first experimenter 
continuously rotated the container to a horizontal and then vertical 
position, just as he or she did in the Initial part of the test event. The 
criteria for ending the pretest trials were the same as in Experiment 1.
During the fesi phase, the infants saw the impossible and possible 
test events described above on alternate trials until they had completed 
three pairs of test trials. At the start of each trial, the first 
experimenter held the container vertically until the computer signaled that
the infant had looked for 5 cumulative s. Each test trial ended when the 
infant (a) looked away for 2 consecutive s after having looked at the
event for at least 9 cumulative s or (b) looked at tho event for 60 
cumulative s without looking away for 2 consecutive s. The infants who 
saw the impossible event container first during the pretest phase saw the 
Impossible test event first, and the intents who saw the possible event 
container first during the pretest phase saw the possible test event first.
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Rasulta
Figure 3 shows the mean looking times of the infants to the 
impossible and possible test events. It can be seen that the Infants looked 
about equally at the two events.
INSERT FIGURE 2
The infants' looking times at the test events were analysed by means 
of a 2 X 3 mixed model analysis of variance with Event (impossible or 
possible event) and Test Pair (first, second, or third pair of test trials) as 
wlthin-subject factors. The main effect of event was not significant,
£ (1 ,95 ) -  0.15, Indicating that the infants tended to look equally at the 
impossible (M -  34.8) and the possible (M  -  35.9) events. The only 
significant effect was that of test pair, £ (2 ,95) -1 8 .8 6 , p -  .0001, 
indicating that the infants looked reliably less as the experiment 
progressed.
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Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 Indicate that the intents looked about 
equally at tee Impossible and possible events. There are at least two 
explanations for this finding. The first is teat tee infants did not 
understand that an object must have sufficient sides in order to contain, 
although they do understand that a bottom Is necessary for containment. 
The second Is that the procedure used did not produce an adequate test of 
whether infants realize teat objects need intact sides for containment. In 
particular, it was thought that providing infants with familiarization 
trials, as in Experiment 1, might help tee infants better focus on the task 
by first acquainting teem with the experimental events (e.g., rotating, 
filling, and emptying). Experiment 3 was designed to examine whether 
infants would better understand the task if they were shown some 
familiarization trials which showed different objects containing salt.
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Experiments
The procedure was identical In Experiment 3 as in Experiment 2 with 
two exceptions. The first is that three familiarization events were added 
which were identical to the impossible and possible test events in 
Experiment 2 with the exception of the specific objects used. The yellow, 
blue, and pink containers used in the familiarization trials of Experiment 1 
were used in the famlliarizalton trials of Experiment 3 . The second Is 
that the inside bottom of the impossible test event container was covered 
with black tape. We hoped that this change would make the hole In the side 
of the container more salient.
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Method
Subjects
Subjects were 12 healthy, full-term infants ranging in age from 10 
months, 29 days to 11 months, 28 days (M -  11 months, 6 days).
Apparatus
The apparatus was identical to that used In Experiment 2 with two 
exceptions. First, the three containers used in the familiarization events 
(the yellow, blue, and pink containers) in Experiment 1 were used in the 
familiarization events in Experiment 3. Second, the bottom of the 
impossible event container, which was visible through the hole in the side 
of the container, was covered with black tape. It was hoped that this 
change would make the hole in the side of the container more salient to the 
infants.
Two experimenters worked in concert to produce the familiarization 
and test events. As in Experiment 2, the first wore a spandex glove 70 cm 
long on his or her left arm and manipulated the containers; the second 
stood behind the back wall of the apparatus and poured salt into the 
containers.
Familiarization events. The three familiarization events were 
identical to the impossible and possible events in Experiment 2 except 
that different containers were used. These were the containers from the 
familiarization events in Experiment 1. The yellow container was used in 
the first event, the blue in the second, and the pink in the third.
Impossible and possible test events. The impossible and possible test
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( snts were Identical to uiose in Experiment 2. 
Procedure
The experiment consisted of three phases: pretest, familiarization, 
and test. The pretest phase was identical to that in Experiment 2. During 
the familiarization phase, the infants saw the three familiarization events 
described above on three successive trials. In  Experiment 3, the criteria 
for determining the end of the familiarization trials was the same as for 
the test trials. The last phase was identical to that in Experiment 2.
Hsautts
Figure 4 shows the mean looking times of the infants to the impossible 
and possible test events. As in Experiment 2, the infan ; looked equally at 
the two events.
INSERT FIGURE 3
The results were analysed like those of Experiment 2. As in Experiment 
2, the main effect of event was not significant, £ (1 ,55) -  0.76, indicating 
that the infants tended to look equally at the impossible (M « 25.8) and the 
possible (M -  22.8) events.
Discussion
As ht Experiment 2, the infants looked about equally at the impossible 
and possible events. These results suggest that 11-month-old infants do 
not understand that an object must have sufficient sides in order to 
contain. These results suggest that infants of this age either (a) do not 
yet have the knowledge that an object must have sufficient sides in order 
to contain or (b) the experimental procedure was not adequate for testing 
this issue in infants.
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Corn ; ion
i lie infants in the experimcn al condition in Experiment 1 (a) 
understood that a concave object that has a bottom (e.g., box) can function 
as a container; (b) recognized that a concave object that does not have a 
bottom (e.g., tube) cannot function as a container and hence (c) were 
surprised that the tube contained the salt when it had no bottom. These 
results suggest that 10.5-month-old infants understand that the physical 
property of a bottom is necessat, ’or containment. The infants in the 
control condition of Experiment I looked longer at the box than at the tube 
event. This suggests that without observing the process of containment 
(no salt was used in the control condition) the infants were more 
interested in the box than in the tube because the box was perceptually 
lass similar than the tube from the familiarization containers. These 
findings indicate that contrary to what Caron et al. (1988) claimed, infants 
as young as 10.5 months of age understand, at least in simple situations, 
that the physical property of a bottom is necessary for containment.
The results o’ Experiment 1 suggest other ways in which infants' 
reasoning about containment resembles that of adults. First, the infants in 
the exper imental condition seemed to have little or no expectation that the 
box would fail to contain the salt. This finding suggests that the infants 
understood, based on their observation of the manipulation of the 
containers in the familiarization trials, that since the box did have a 
bottom, just as the familiarization containers did, the box would perform 
the function of containment as successfully as the familiarization
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containers. This observation was made even though the infants had not 
been shown in the familiarization trials a container that looked like a box 
(the familiarization containers were cylindrical). This is of course 
exactly the same conclusion adults would have drawn in the same 
situation. Second, even though the tube test container was shaped and 
decorated in a manner very similar to the containers in the familiarization 
trials, the infants did not assume that the tuba was also a container. This 
finding suggests that 10.5-month-old infants have some knowledge of 
containment in that they realize that a bottom is necessary to support the 
substance inside of the object (e.g., salt). Whether the infants also 
understand, as adults do, that an object needs intact, or sufficient sides in 
order to contain was tested in Experiment 2.
The results of Experiment 2 indicated that 11.5-month-old infants 
looked equally at the possible and impossible test events. This result 
suggests that the infants do not understand that a object that does not 
have intact sides will not hold the substance poured into it. There are two 
plausible explanations for this finding. First, the infants did not yet have 
the knowledge that an object with a large hole cut in its side cannot 
contain a substance such as salt. Second, the experimental procedure did 
not adequately test this understanding in infants. Experiment 3 was 
designed to examine whether changing the experimental procedure would 
help the infants to express their knowledge of the necessity of sufficient 
sides for containment.
Unfortunately, the results of Experimental 3 were also negative. It 
appears that the addition of familiarization trials did not assist the
38
infants in expressing their knowledge of the necessity of Intact sides for 
containment. These findings suggest that infants' basis for making 
decisions about the physical properties that are necessary for containment 
is, not surprisingly, far less sophisticated than adults.
It is possible, however, that a novel method could be devised that 
would reveal infants' knowledge of the necessity of sufficient sides for 
containment. One particular method that we have considered is to use a 
cylindrical object, similar to the one used in the above experiments, but to 
cut several holes in the side of the cylinder, and to cover these holes with 
non-glare clear plastic (so that there is not a shine in the plastic revealing 
the invisible sides). This method may make it more obvious to the infants 
that the container does not have intact sides and thus more interesting. It 
is hoped that this method or others devised will not only reveal infants' 
understanding of sides, but will also address additional questions 
concerning containment such as: Do infants' actions upon objects play a 
large role in the development of their knowledge about containment, or is 
such knowledge present long before they become adept at manipulating 
objects? 1.3 the age at which infants begin to understand that a bottom is 
necessary for containment much younger than 10.5 months? These 
questions are not only Interesting in themselves, but also underscore the 
total complexity of infants' physical knowledge of objects.
39
40
Bibliography
Baillargeon, R. (1986). Representing the existence and the location of 
hidden objects: Object permanence in 6- and 8-month-old infants. 
Cognition. 23.21 -41.
Baillargeon, R. (1987a). Object permanence in 3.5- and 4.5-month-old 
infants. Deyfllcpmental Psychology. 23 . 655-684.
Baillargeon, R. (1987b). Young infants* reasoning about the physical and 
spatial characteristics of a hidden object. Cognitive Development. 2. 
179-200.
Baillargeon, R. (in press). The object concept revisited: New directions. 
To appear in H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in Child Development and 
Behavior. Volume 23. New York: Academic Press.
Baillargeon, R., & Graber, M. (1987). Where's the rabbit? 5.5-month-old 
infants' representation of the height of a hidden object. Cognitive
41
Devel ♦ J♦ ] 1 1 L- JI L 2.375-392.
Baillargeon, R., & Hanko-Summere, S. (in press). Is the top object 
adequately supported by the bottom object? Young infants' 
understanding of support relations. To appear in Cognitive 
Development.
Baillargeon, R., Spelke, E. S., & Wasserman, S. (1985). Object permanence 
in 5-month-old infants. Coonltlon. 20.191-208.
Caron, A. J., Caron, R. F., & Anted, S. E. (1988). Infant understanding of 
containment: An attendance perceived or a relationship conceived? 
Developmental Psychology. 24.620-627.
Gibson, E. J., Owsley, C., & Johnston, J. (1978). Perception of Invariants 
by five-month-old infants: Differentiation of two types of motion. 
Developmental Psychology. 14. 407-415.
Gibson, E. J., Owsley, C., Walker, A., & Megaw-Nyoe, J. (1979).
42
Development of the perception of invariants: Substance and shape. 
Perception. 8.609-619.
Gibson, E. J., & Spelke, E. S. (1983). The development of perception. In J. 
H. Flavell & E. M. Markman (Eds.), Cognitive development (Vol.3). 
Manual of child psychology. New York: Wiley.
Hood, B., & Willats, P. (1986, April). Reaching In the dark: Object
permanence in 5-month-olds. Paper presented at the biennial meeting 
of the International Conference on Infant Studies, Los Angeles.
Leslie, A. M., & Keeble, S. (1987). Do six-month-old infants perceive 
causality? Cognition. 25. 265-288.
Macomber, J., Spelke, E. S., & Keil, F. (1988, April). Early development of 
thft object concept: Knowledge of substance and gravity. Paper 
presented at the Sixth International Conference on Infant Studies, 
Washington.
43
SAS User Guide: Statistics. 1985 edition. Gary, NC: SAS Institute Inc.
Spelke, E.S. (1985). Preferential-looking methods as tools for the study of 
cognition in infancy. In G. Gottlieb & N. Krasnegor (Eds.), 
Measuremont of Audition and Vision in the first year of Postnatal 
Life. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Spelke, E. S. (in press). Where perceiving ends and thinking begins: The 
apprehension of objects in infancy. In A. Yonas (Ed.), Perceptual
Development in Infancy: Minnesota Symposia on Child Psychology.
(Vol. 20). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Walker, A., Owsley, C. J., Megaw-Nyce, J., Gibson, E. J. & Bahrick, L. B. 
(1980). Detection of elasticity as an invariant property of objects 
by young infants. Perception. 9.713-718.
^e
an
 L
oo
ki
ng
 T
xm
e 
(s
ec
) 
Me
an
 L
oo
ki
ng
 T
m?
 (
se
c)
30 r 
28 -
26
24 -
22 ~
20
Experiment 1 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION
\
\
\
Possible
Event
Test Pair 
Figure 1a
25 r 
23 
21 
19 
17 
15
CONTROL CONDITION
v
\  Box
\  Event
J---------------- --------L ._________ _ j
1 2 3
Test Pair
Figure 1b
Experiment 2
Me
an
 L
oo
ki
ng
 T
is
€ 
(s
ec
)
Experiment 3
Test Pair 
Figure 3
